That doesn’t sound fair to Greenland if/when Trump loses.

I don’t know a single American that believes what you just said. Most of us recognize this as bullshit.

Note: I’m not in a deep red state

Also strategic control of the melting and ever more passable Arctic, along with Russia. This also partly explains why Trump wants Canada.

This is going to be interesting because Article 5 assumes an attack on a member state by a non-member state.

By attacking Greenland, Trump would violate Articles 1 and 2 (pledging to use peaceful means to settle a dispute and contribute to friendly relations though you could argue he’s violating the latter right now).

I think the whole point of this act is to force NATO to kick the US out of NATO, which is exactly what Russia (and by extension Trump) wants.

Greenland is one of the only (the only?) largely indigenous governed country (ish) in the world and one of its official languages alongside Danish is Greenlandic, an inuit language. So, yea, for some shitty old white American dude to continue to demand annexing this country is some fucking wild bullshit.

Ahhhhh. NOW the Canada and Greenland thing makes sense. If Trump took over Canada and Greenland, then Russia gains full control of the artic.

Oh for sure. I just keep seeing Greenland everywhere since it seems to be Trump’s flavor of the week, and knowing it’s not as big as it look on the Mercator projection, I finally decided to see how large it really is.

For our Aussie friends, it’s about the same size as Qld and NSW.

Right?

I wouldn’t say it’s clever either but it’s the gish gallop, it’s like a sportsball play where they Flood The Zone and called their little brothers from the JV team and now those guys are milling about on the field

I feel like Goering, may his shredded soul exist in agony forever, was being optimistically naive and arrogant, trying to curry favor with his fuhrer…but hey, they got a war, so maybe I’m the naive one. Here’s an argument from The Dictator’s Handbook by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith:

Two thousand five hundred years ago, Sun Tzu literaly wrote the book on how to wage war. Although his advice has been influential to leaders down through the centuries, leading American foreign policy advisers have contradicted his war-fighting doctrines. Ronald Reagan’s secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, George W. Bush’s first secretary of state, Colin Powel, and, with slight modifications, Bill Clinton’s second secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, all prescribe a doctrine of when and how the United States should fight. And it differs radicaly from the time-tested advice of Sun Tzu. The reason Sun Tzu has served so many leaders so well over twenty-five centuries is that his is the right advice for kings, chieftains, and autocrats of every shape to folow. Until recently, and with very few exceptions, small-coalition systems have been the dominant form of government. But these are the wrong policies for a leader beholden to many. Democratic war fighting emphasizes public welfare, exactly as should be the case when advising a leader who relies on a large coalition. Sun Tzu’s advice is exactly right for a small-coalition leader. To see this, let’s have a look at the ideas expressed by Sun Tzu and Caspar Weinberger. Sun Tzu contended to his king, Ho Lu of Wu, that: The skillful general does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply wagons loaded more than twice. Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for reinforcements, nor will he turn his army back for fresh supplies, but crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. The value of time—that is, being a little ahead of your opponent—has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to commissariat… Now, in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger. For them to perceive the advantage of defeating the enemy, they must also have their rewards. Thus, when you capture spoils from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have a keen desire to fight, each on his own account.

In contrast to Sun Tzu’s perspective, Caspar Weinberger maintained that: First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies… Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all… Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and send the forces needed to do just that… Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size, composition, and disposition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict. When they do change, then so must our combat requirements… Fifth, before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress… Finally, the commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.

Sun Tzu’s ideas can coarsely be summarized as folows: (1) an advantage in capabilities is not as important as quick action in war; (2) the resources mobilized to fight should be sufficient for a short campaign that does not require reinforcement or significant additional provisions from home; and (3) the provision of private goods is essential to motivate soldiers to fight. Sun Tzu says that if the army initially raised proves insufficient or if new supplies are required more than once, then the commanders lack sufficient skill to carry the day. In that case, he advises that it is best to give up the fight rather than risk exhausting the state’s treasure. Weinberger’s doctrine does not emphasize swift victory, but rather a willingness to spend however much is needed to achieve victory, a point made even more emphatically in the Powell Doctrine. Weinberger and Powell argue that the United States should not get involved in any war in which it is not prepared to commit enough resources to win. They, and Madeleine Albright too, argue for being very cautious about risking war. Once a decision is made to take that risk, then, as Weinberger (and Powell) recognize, the United States must be prepared to raise a larger army and to spend more treasure if necessitated by developments on the ground. War should only be fought with confidence that victory will folow and that victory serves the interests of the American people. Sun Tzu emphasizes the benefits of spoils to motivate combatants (“when you capture spoils from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have a keen desire to fight, each on his own account”). Weinberger emphasizes the public good of protecting vital national interests. For Sun Tzu, the interest soldiers have in the political objectives behind a fight or their concern for the common good is of no consequence in determining their motivation to wage war. That is why he emphasizes that soldiers fight, “each on his own account.” Sun Tzu’s attentiveness to private rewards and Weinberger’s concentration on the public good of protecting the national interest (however that may be understood) represent the great divide between small-coalition and large-coalition regimes. Our view of politics instructs us to anticipate that leaders who depend on lots of essential backers only fight when they believe victory is nearly certain. Otherwise, they look for ways to resolve their international differences peacefully. Leaders who rely only on a few essential supporters, in contrast, are prepared to fight even when the odds of winning are not particularly good. Democratic leaders try hard to win if the going gets tough. Autocrats make a good initial effort and if that proves wanting they quit.

He’s not wrong, but I don’t think pacifist is the word that should be used to describe the opposition to invading Greenland or Canada, or Panama.

I hear Greenland has WMDs - in the form of melting glaciers that will cause some kind of climate catastrophe. /s