Admin of lm.put.tf, there isn’t anything special there, just an instance for friends.

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Cake day: June 21st, 2023

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  • That’s not quite right though, there’s the factor you know (password to your vault), and the factor you have (a copy of the encrypted vault).

    That would be true for offline vaults, but for services hosted on internet I don’t think so. Assuming the victim does not use 2FA on their Bitwarden account, all an attacker needs is the victim’s credentials (email and password). Once you present the factor you know, the vault is automatically downloaded from their services.


    This is something I hadn’t thought until know, but I guess password managers might(?) change the factor type from something you know (the password in your head) to something you have (the vault). At which point, if you have 2FA enabled on other services, you are authenticating with 2 things you have, the vault and your phone.


  • Although it’s true that you are increasing the attack surface when compared to locally stored OTP keys, in the context of OTPs, it doesn’t matter. It still is doing it’s job as the second factor of authentication. The password is something you know, and the OTP is something you have (your phone/SIM card).

    I would argue it is much worse what 1Password and Bitwarden (and maybe others?) allows the users to do. Which is to have the both the password and the OTP generator inside the same vault. For all intents and purposes this becomes a single factor as both are now something you know (the password to your vault).