Regarding Poland, again, this was territory Poland had conquered previously that historically belonged to countries in the Soviet Union. This was a return of territory. By no means did it come without bloodshed, but nevertheless the soviets were not nearly the butchers the Nazis were.
As for the west conspiring to kill of the Soviet Union, and letting Germany do so, again, I gave naked testimony that this was the case. The Soviet Union wanted above all else to survive, the Nazis wanted new colonial territories, and the west wanted to not get colonized by the Nazis while also wanting the Soviets to stop being socialist.
Do you have a source on a British warning to Germany?
Wolkow W. K. (2003), Stalin wollte ein anderes Europa. Moskaus Außenpolitik 1940 bis 1968 und die Folgen, Edition Ost, Berlin, p. 110.
The British warnings to the USSR were sadly ignored; Stalin did not order the Red Army to get ready for an invasion, which was partially why the first few months of the war went so disastrously poorly for the Soviets.
I already explained this earlier. There was a massivedisinformation campaign, with feints from both Germany and the western powers. The first few weeks went as everyone expected, the Nazis advanced quickly over largely open land until running face to face with the full industrialized might of the Red Army. Goebbels’ diary is quite telling of the change in attitude. On the 22nd-23rd of June, the Nazis attacked confidently. On July 2nd, Goebbels wrote the following:
Overall, the fighting is hard and stubborn. We can in no way speak of a walk in the park. The red regime has mobilized the people.
July 24th:
We can have no doubt whatsoever about the fact that the Bolshevik regime, which has existed for nearly a quarter of a century, has left a deep mark on the peoples of the Soviet Union […]. It would be right, therefore, if we clearly informed the German people about the harshness of the struggle taking place in the East. The nation must be told that this operation is very difficult, but that we can and will survive it.
August 1st:
At the Führer’s headquarters […] they also openly admit that they were somewhat mistaken in their assessment of Soviet fighting power. The Bolsheviks are showing stronger resistance than we expected, and above all the material means at their disposal are greater than we had anticipated.
August 9th:
Privately, the Führer is very displeased for having allowed himself to be so deceived about the potential of the Bolsheviks by the reports [sent by German agents] coming from the Soviet Union. In particular, the underestimation of the enemy’s tanks and aircraft caused a great deal of trouble for our military operations. He suffers a lot because of this. We’re dealing with a serious crisis […]. The previous campaigns were a walk in the park by comparison […]. The Führer is not worried about the West […]. In our German thoroughness and objectivity we have always overestimated the enemy, except, in this case, the Bolsheviks.
September 16th:
We have totally underestimated the strength of the Bolsheviks.
This was not a walk in the park for the Nazis, because the Soviets planned for it. Modern historiography makes it quite clear that the Nazis and Soviets were never allies in any capacity, for any length of time, and were always conspiring against each other with no expectation of actual peace, just biding their time before what they desired to be a favorable start to war.
Regarding Poland, again, this was territory Poland had conquered previously that historically belonged to countries in the Soviet Union. This was a return of territory. By no means did it come without bloodshed, but nevertheless the soviets were not nearly the butchers the Nazis were.
So which is it then? A reconquest of lost territory or not? And regarding the butchering: historians absolutely do compare the Soviet terror inflicted on eastern Poland with what the Nazis did in the same period in western Poland, and found the Soviets were worse. See Poland’s Holocaust: Ethnic Strife, Collaboration with Occupying Forces and Genocide in the Second Republic, 1918-1947 which reads
In many ways, the work of Soviet NKVD in Eastern Poland proved far more destructive than that of Gestapo.
Though of course comparing historical atrocities is always a bit dubious to do. The Soviets certainly weren’t seen as saviours by any means.
Wolkow W. K. (2003), Stalin wollte ein anderes Europa. Moskaus Außenpolitik 1940 bis 1968 und die Folgen, Edition Ost, Berlin, p. 110.
Unfortunately I can’t find a copy of the book so I can’t verify what it says. If you have a link I’d be grateful. One thing to look out for though is the “Suvorov” idea that Stalin was planning to strike Germany in 41 and that Hitler therefore did a pre-emptive strike. This is a very hotly disputed take on history and is sometimes used in neo-Nazi circles to claim that Hitler wasn’t such a bad guy (he was). Just something to watch out for. But I’d rather be able to view the passage in the book, I tried looking for sources citing it but couldn’t find it (probably because it’s in German and mine isn’t that good).
I already explained this earlier. There was a massivedisinformation campaign, with feints from both Germany and the western powers.
Western intelligence passed to the USSR was confirmed to be accurate by the NKVD before the start of the war. As far as I can find, Stalin didn’t doubt the intel, he made a wrong judgement. He believed not mobilizing would motivate the Nazis to postpone any invasion because they were dealing with Britain still. Evidence to the contrary was ignored by him, both from the NKVD as well as the west. As a result the first part of the war was a bloodbath, and only once the Soviets regrouped could they mount an effective resistance.
Goebbels ideas on the war I don’t take too seriously, since that dude was huffing his own copium on how great and enlightend the aryans were and how primitive and stupid slavic people were. Of course Russia would never be a cakewalk to invade. Still, the Soviets lost their most experienced soldiers very early on in the war, as well as a large amount of equipments, airbases, etc… They lost more than was necessary, had they raised their readiness when intel suggested they should have.
Regarding Poland, no, the Soviets were not worse. The Nazis subjected the Polish to the holocaust, and was committed to exterminating millions of Poles. One historian saying “in many ways, the soviets were worse” doesn’t even mean the soviets were worse in total, yet that’s the implication you bring. Historical evidence backs up that the Nazi colonization of Poland was a prototype for the Nazi colonization of the Soviets.
As for Stalin and preparation for Barbarossa, again, reports conflicted. The Soviets knew that the Nazis were going to eventually invade, which is why Stalin had the Red Army prepare for German invasion. It wasn’t that Stalin didn’t mobilize the Red Army, it’s that Stalin refused to muster forces on the border, which was exactly what the Nazis wanted. The Nazis wanted to quickly route the Red Army and march straight to Moscow relatively unopposed, instead they ran through largely empty, wide-open land quickly, before running into extreme resistance.
If you don’t trust Goebbels, there’s plenty of other testemonies from Nazi officials, such as General Fedor von Bock in late July:
The enemy seeks to recapture Smolensk at all costs and is constantly sending in new forces. The theory expressed by some that the enemy acts without plans is not reflected in the facts […]. We’ve verified that the Russians have brought up across the front a new and compact deployment of forces. In many areas they seek to go on the offensive. It’s surprising for an adversary which suffered so many blows; they must possess an unbelievable amount of resources, in fact our troops still lament the power of the enemy artillery.
Here’s an excerpt from Domenico Losurdo’s book on Stalin:
Long read as an example of political-military ignorance or even blind trust in the Third Reich, the extremely cautious approach taken by Stalin in the weeks leading up to the outbreak of hostilities now appears in an entirely different light: “The relatively open concentration of Wehrmacht forces along the Soviet border, the violations of Soviet airspace and numerous other provocations had only a single purpose: to draw the main forces of the Red Army as close to the border as possible. Hitler wanted to win the war in one gigantic battle.” Even valiant generals were enticed by this trap. Expecting an onslaught, they insisted on a massive relocation of troops toward the border. However, “Stalin categorically rejected this demand, insisting on the need to maintain large-scale reserves at a considerable distance from any conceivable front line.” After the war, studying the material left behind by the German architects of Operation Barbarossa, marshall Georgy K. Zhukov recognized the correctness of the line pursued by Stalin: “Hitler’s command was counting on us bringing our main forces up to the border with the intention of surrounding and destroying them.”
Now, you may say that Zhukov was simply trying to play the political line. However, it’s abundantly clear that this is in fact exactly how it played out. The rapid conquest of largely open land was met with a rapid counteroffensive that placed the Nazis in a dreadful stalemate, and eventually a legendary counterattack. Had Stalin listened to his generals, it’s likely they would have played into the Nazi’s plans.
Regarding Poland, again, this was territory Poland had conquered previously that historically belonged to countries in the Soviet Union. This was a return of territory. By no means did it come without bloodshed, but nevertheless the soviets were not nearly the butchers the Nazis were.
As for the west conspiring to kill of the Soviet Union, and letting Germany do so, again, I gave naked testimony that this was the case. The Soviet Union wanted above all else to survive, the Nazis wanted new colonial territories, and the west wanted to not get colonized by the Nazis while also wanting the Soviets to stop being socialist.
Wolkow W. K. (2003), Stalin wollte ein anderes Europa. Moskaus Außenpolitik 1940 bis 1968 und die Folgen, Edition Ost, Berlin, p. 110.
I already explained this earlier. There was a massivedisinformation campaign, with feints from both Germany and the western powers. The first few weeks went as everyone expected, the Nazis advanced quickly over largely open land until running face to face with the full industrialized might of the Red Army. Goebbels’ diary is quite telling of the change in attitude. On the 22nd-23rd of June, the Nazis attacked confidently. On July 2nd, Goebbels wrote the following:
July 24th:
August 1st:
August 9th:
September 16th:
This was not a walk in the park for the Nazis, because the Soviets planned for it. Modern historiography makes it quite clear that the Nazis and Soviets were never allies in any capacity, for any length of time, and were always conspiring against each other with no expectation of actual peace, just biding their time before what they desired to be a favorable start to war.
So which is it then? A reconquest of lost territory or not? And regarding the butchering: historians absolutely do compare the Soviet terror inflicted on eastern Poland with what the Nazis did in the same period in western Poland, and found the Soviets were worse. See Poland’s Holocaust: Ethnic Strife, Collaboration with Occupying Forces and Genocide in the Second Republic, 1918-1947 which reads
Though of course comparing historical atrocities is always a bit dubious to do. The Soviets certainly weren’t seen as saviours by any means.
Unfortunately I can’t find a copy of the book so I can’t verify what it says. If you have a link I’d be grateful. One thing to look out for though is the “Suvorov” idea that Stalin was planning to strike Germany in 41 and that Hitler therefore did a pre-emptive strike. This is a very hotly disputed take on history and is sometimes used in neo-Nazi circles to claim that Hitler wasn’t such a bad guy (he was). Just something to watch out for. But I’d rather be able to view the passage in the book, I tried looking for sources citing it but couldn’t find it (probably because it’s in German and mine isn’t that good).
Western intelligence passed to the USSR was confirmed to be accurate by the NKVD before the start of the war. As far as I can find, Stalin didn’t doubt the intel, he made a wrong judgement. He believed not mobilizing would motivate the Nazis to postpone any invasion because they were dealing with Britain still. Evidence to the contrary was ignored by him, both from the NKVD as well as the west. As a result the first part of the war was a bloodbath, and only once the Soviets regrouped could they mount an effective resistance.
Goebbels ideas on the war I don’t take too seriously, since that dude was huffing his own copium on how great and enlightend the aryans were and how primitive and stupid slavic people were. Of course Russia would never be a cakewalk to invade. Still, the Soviets lost their most experienced soldiers very early on in the war, as well as a large amount of equipments, airbases, etc… They lost more than was necessary, had they raised their readiness when intel suggested they should have.
Regarding Poland, no, the Soviets were not worse. The Nazis subjected the Polish to the holocaust, and was committed to exterminating millions of Poles. One historian saying “in many ways, the soviets were worse” doesn’t even mean the soviets were worse in total, yet that’s the implication you bring. Historical evidence backs up that the Nazi colonization of Poland was a prototype for the Nazi colonization of the Soviets.
As for Stalin and preparation for Barbarossa, again, reports conflicted. The Soviets knew that the Nazis were going to eventually invade, which is why Stalin had the Red Army prepare for German invasion. It wasn’t that Stalin didn’t mobilize the Red Army, it’s that Stalin refused to muster forces on the border, which was exactly what the Nazis wanted. The Nazis wanted to quickly route the Red Army and march straight to Moscow relatively unopposed, instead they ran through largely empty, wide-open land quickly, before running into extreme resistance.
If you don’t trust Goebbels, there’s plenty of other testemonies from Nazi officials, such as General Fedor von Bock in late July:
Here’s an excerpt from Domenico Losurdo’s book on Stalin:
Now, you may say that Zhukov was simply trying to play the political line. However, it’s abundantly clear that this is in fact exactly how it played out. The rapid conquest of largely open land was met with a rapid counteroffensive that placed the Nazis in a dreadful stalemate, and eventually a legendary counterattack. Had Stalin listened to his generals, it’s likely they would have played into the Nazi’s plans.